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ANTHONY SMiTH DECLARATION

1

I, Anthony Smith, declare:

2
Radiological Work History & Training

3

4

1.

In total, I have seven years of experience working in the nuclear industry.

5

2.

I started my career as a radiation worker in 2002, when I was hired as a "deconner"

6
7

(i.e. a decontamination technician) to do decontamination work for New World Environmental
("NWE"), a radiological-staffing company. My first radiological jobs were short term assignments

8
9

at military facilities in Maryland, Virginia, and Alabama. Later that year, I took a job at Hunters

O Point Naval Shipyard ("HPNS"), where I assisted with characterization sreys to identify
1

11

radiologically impacted areas in anticipation of future remediation. My first job at Hunters Point

12 lasted about one year, until I was laid off in 2003.

13

14

3.

J

After my first job at Hunters Point Shipyard, I took and passed the Department of

Energy's (DOE) Radiological Control Technician (RCT) CORE Exam. I was previously told I

15
would need to pass the CORE Exam to work at HPNS as a Health Physics Specialist ("HP") when

16

17
18

remediation work picked up. I passed the exam in 2003. The DOE CORE Exam covers
fundamental radiation concepts and functions performed by HPs (also known as radiation control

19 technicians, or "RCTs"), including mathematics and physical science, sources of radiation,
20 sampling methods, survey instrumentation, dosimetry, and worker safety, among other topics.
21

22

Passing the CORE exam qualified me to work as an RCT/HP at·Hunters Point as well as most
other nuclear or radiological sites in the country.

23
4.

In addition to passing the DOE CORE Exam, I completed annual testing to

24

25

maintain proficiency in radiological remediation practices. I also completed various onsite

26 radiation and safety trainings throughout my career. When I worked at HPNS the second time, rad
27 workers were often assigned readings on radiation-related topics to study on their own time, and

28
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1

HPs were quizzed in a limited way by supervisors at our daily morning meeting. Together these

2 trainings, along with expected prior experience and training, were intended to ensure HPs on the
3 site were informed of proper radiological procedures as well as the health and safety risks
4 associated with rad work. I observed that a number of the HPs did not appear to be

5

knowledgeable or studying on their own as I was when at Hunters Point.

6

Experience at Hunters Point Shipyard

7
5.

In 2006, I returned to work at Hunters Point Shipyard as a Junior HP for New

8
9

World Environmental and I was promoted to a Senior HP by NWE. Around the end of2009, I was

10 forced to switched employers to Radiological Survey & Remediation Services, LLC ("RSRS") or
11

be terminated because NWE was losing the sub-contract. RSRS made me a Junior HP for a

12 number of months, and after about eight months promoted me to Senior HP, but my duties

13
14

remained largely the same throughout my second stint at Hunters Point.
6.

Over the course of my later six years at Hunters Point I performed a variety of HP

15
16

roles across the base. The majority of my time was spent performing building surveys. I also

17 performed soil sampling in the field and within Radiological Screening Yards ("RSYs"), oversaw
18 laborers and provided access control for buildings and Radiologically Controlled Areas ("RCAs"),
19 and worked the Portal Monitor screening vehicles entering and exiting the site.
20
21

7.

Beginning in mid-2008, I noticed improper rad practices taking place at HPNS,

including false soil sampling, incomplete building surveys, falsification of chain-of-custody

22
("COC") documentation, and data manipulation. In my view, the emergence of Tetra Tech as the

23
24
25

primary radiological contractor coincided with the negative shift in culture and bad practices at the
site. It is my understanding that while prior to 2008 NWE was the holder of the Nuclear

26 Regulatory Commission (''NRC") radioactive materials license that governed the radiological
27 work performed. Tetra Tech became the NRC license holder about that time that improper rad
28
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practices became a regular event and as a result Tetra Tech gained more control over the rad work

2 performed by subcontractors like NWE and Aleut World Solutions.

3

4
5

6

Building 351A
8.

My first experience with improper or fraudulent sampling occurred in the late fall

of2008, when I was assigned to oversee a soil-remediation project in the crawl space under

7

8
9

Building 351A. Building 351A was the last building to undergo remediation on Parcel G and was
therefore the only work preventing Parcel G from free release by regulators. Building 351A was

10 previously used by the Navy's Radiological Defense Laboratory and was confirmed during our
11

characterization surveys as containing radioactive contaminants exceeding release levels. Areas of

12 the building and the soil areas under the building that could be accessed in a crawl space were
13

identified as containing radioactive materials above release levels that were required to be

14
removed in the remediation process. As part of the Building 351A remediation of the crawl area,
15

16

there were roughly a dozen laborers in protective gear (rubber boots and respirators) tasked with

17 digging up the soil using shovels and trowels. Tetra Tech also rented a special soil vacuum truck

18 with a long, eight inch hose to suck up the contaminated dirt that the laborers had loosened. The

19 vacuum system deposited the soil in a container designated for low level radioactive waste, which
2 0 was later shipped off site.
21

9.

During the Building 351A project, fellow HP Josh Hooper and I were responsible

22
for manning the opening to the crawl space and frisking (i.e., scanning the people and equipment
23
24

for radioactive contamination prior to leaving the Building 351A work area) to ensure they were

25 clean. Once the laborers completed the remediation work under the building, Josh and I were also
26 responsible for post-remediation sampling of the area so that the building could be cleared for
27 release. I asked that Josh and I be provided with respirators because of the large amount of air

28

3

1
2

borne dust under the building in the crawl area, as well as other standard personal protective
equipment. Chuck Taylor, Tetra Tech' RSO representative and field supervisor, refused the

3 request for the PPE respirator. Josh and I took a number of soil samples throughout the crawl area
4

under building 351A and placed in containers for the samples to be tested by the laboratory at

5 Hunters Point. Documents of the samples were done to show where the sample was taken, at what
6
time, by who, and related information and kept with the samples. All together, the remediation

7

8
9

process took several weeks to complete.

10.

A day or two after Hooper and I finished post-remediation sampling and delivered

10 the samples to the on-site laboratory, we were approached by HP Supervisor Steve Rolfe and
11

asked to attend a meeting with management at Tetra Tech's HPNS office that was close to the end

12 of the day. Approximately a dozen senior managers were present at the meeting, including RSRS

13
14

Vice Presidents Daryl DeLong, Brian Henderson, Tetra Tech's Project Manager Bill Dougherty,
and Construction Superintendent Dennis McWade. Mr. Bert Bowers, the NWE RSOR was not in

15
16

the meeting, and that was a puzzle to me as the meeting progressed. During the meeting

17 Dougherty explained to us the cost and effort that went into the Building 351A remediation,
18 asking us with words to the effect "Do you know how much it costs us to rent that machine for
19 two weeks?" Dougherty also told us that the test results of the post remediation soil samples
20 showed some of the highest radioactive readings ever seen on the Hunters Point site. After
21

discussing the cost of the delay having these elevated soil samples would cause, namely that the

22
laborers would have to return to do more digging with the vacuum truck and we would need to

23
24

take more post-remediation samples, Dougherty instructed us to destroy the existing highly

25 contaminated radioactive soil samples from Building 351A and any related documentation, and
26 directed us to take new samples from areas in the crawl space known to be clean.

27

28
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1

11.

Hooper and I returned to Building 351A to take new samples as we were told. We

2 took the samples from areas that had been marked with flags, which were placed by engineers that
3 had been directed to put flags in areas that were previously identified through surveys as
4 consistent with natural background radiation levels that would get lab clearance. The new samples
5

6

were then used to clear Building 351A and secure free release of Parcel G. In other words, the new
samples did come from Building 351A, but were done to intentionally avoid the areas that had

7

8
9

been shown to still have high radioactive contamination under the building. The re-sampling was
taken selectively so that additional remediation would not be required, although the rules and

10 procedures did require additional remediation due to the true soil sample lab results. To my

11 knowledge, the contamination in Building 351A was never remediated.
12

13

Parcel A Cesium-137
12.

The fraudulent sampling at Building 351A was not an isolated incident; in fact, it

14
was just the first of many. For example, less than a year later, around July or August of 2009, I
15

16

was assigned to HP Supervisor Justin Hubbard's crew and tasked with performing surveys and

17 sampling as part of a project remediating sewer lines along Fisher Avenue and Spear Street. At the
18 beginning of the project, Justin Hubbard directed me to take a background sample from
19 somewhere in a nearby adjoining area that did not have radioactive contamination in order to
20 establish naturally occurring levels of radiation for the sewer line work. I chose to take a sample
21

along the border of Parcel A- an area we were told had never been used for radiological purposes

22
and was already transferred to the City of San Francisco for development because it was believed
23
24

to be free of any radioactive contamination above free release levels. Bordering Fisher Avenue

25 there was a retaining wall that descended in height as it ran east to west parallel to the street, and
26 behind the wall was a hill that went up towards the Parcel A development site. The retaining wall
27 was about waist-high near the stop sign at the intersection of Fisher and Spear, about 20 feet from

28
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the light pole. I reached over the wall and dug a hole to take the sample. I used my trowel to dig

2 about 6 inches into the ground, and then removed some soil from the bottom of the hole, and
3 placed the soil from the bottom of the hole in a plastic sample jar. I then walked back to our
4
5

6

meeting point and gave the jar to Justin Hubbard, who then took the sample to the on-site lab. In a
breach of proper procedure, no chain-of-custody (COC) form accompanied the sample.
13.

The next morning or so, Justin Hubbard brought the soil sample out to our meeting

7
spot and told me the sample tested "hot" for radiation at a level of two to three picocuries of

8

9

cesium. Other members of the project crew at the meeting point that morning included HPs Ray

10 Roberson, Carey Bell, and Jeff Rolfe. Hubbard stated to all of us in regards to the soil sample from

11 Parcel A - " get rid of it and not say a word," or words to that effect. I took the sample back to the
12 same area above the wall and dumped the soil back into the hole I originally took it from. I then

13

disposed of the plastic sample jar in a bin for contaminated radiological waste. In the end, we used

14
the established background area near building 505 for the background sample for the Fisher Ave.
15
16
17

and Spear St. projects, although the building 505 area was quite some distance from the street
project. I am aware that the Navy and EPA established release criteria levels, so that soil had to be

18 remediated due to health and safety concerns if it tested above those levels. Different radioactive
19 levels were set for each specific type of radioactive material we encountered at Hunters Point.
20 The release level for cesium-137 was 0.113 picocuries. The cesium-137 results from the sample I

21

took near Parcel A as reported as 2 to 3 picocuries was approximately 18 to 26 times more

22
hazardous than the safety level set by the Navy and the state and federal regulators that oversaw

23
24
25

the Hunters Point project.
14.

As far as I am aware, I was the first and only person to take a sample of the soil.at

26 Parcel A. To my knowledge the radioactive contamination I found in Parcel A was not further
27 investigated or remediated.

28
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Fake Soil Sampling

1

2
3

15.

After the Building 351A and Parcel A cover ups, fraudulent sampling became a

regular occurrence for me and the teams I worked with at Hunters Point. From time to time I was

4 assigned to work with a team ofHPs under the direction of Tetra Tech supervisor Steven Rolfe.

5

6

When we were doing soil sampling, and that soil sampling was to check on whether the
remediation work that had been done was effective, with increasing regularity I and the team

7

8
9

working for Mr. Rolfe were directed by Mr. Rolfe to take fake soil samples. In this early period of
2009 to early 2010, when post-remediation sampling was to be done, more and more Mr. Rolfe

10 told me and the other HPs to cheat and take false soil samples. To do the post-remediation soil
11

samples properly, engineers were to mark on the ground where we were to take soil samples

12 because those spots were supposed to have the highest radiological readings. By taking the

13

samples from the high reading areas it was presumed that if those areas were tested and came in

14
under the Navy's and regulators' "release criteria" standards, then the entire area should be within

15
16

the release criteria standards. When Mr. Rolfe told us to cheat by taking false samples, he

17 instructed us to look like we were taking the samples from the marked spots, but to actually put
18 soil into the sample containers that would go to the lab from nearby soil that was not marked by
19 the engineers as the hot spots for rad contamination.

20
21

16.

After a number of months of taking fake soil samples that were close to the marked

areas, Mr. Rolfe told us that Tetra Tech bosses were not happy because the fake soil samples were

22
being tested by the lab and still coming back with lab results that were too high and above release

23
24

criteria, so remediation would have to be re-done. Mr. Rolfe explained that Tetra Tech EC did not

25 want to have to re-do the remediation because of the lab failures, and we were to get fake soil
26 samples from areas from now on that we knew would be clean of elevated radioactive
27 contamination.

28

7

1

17.

Beginning around 2010, I was doing soil sampling, called "dirt work" - in what we

2 called "the triangle area" near Building 707 and later around the 500 series ofbuildings. Due to

3 the directions of Mr. Rolfe, I was instructed that I was to get soil that was known to be clean and
4 pretend that soil came from the Building 707 area and later the 500 building series we were
5

6

assigned to sample. I had learned that soil in certain parts of the shipyard was clean and could
easily be swapped with other samples in order to quickly obtain lab and regulatory clearance due

7
8

9

to the fake samples of clean soil we submitted.

18.

More specifically, I knew that the soil in a sewer trench in front of an area of the

10 500 series of buildings as well as the soil underlying the foundation of the old Hunters Point
11

movie theater was clean serpentine or "green" dirt, and that the soil underneath the two palm trees

12 near the old pump house (Building 521) also near the old theater was clean sandy soil. At the

13

direction of HP Supervisor Steve Rolfe, other HPs and I would wait until lunch time or after work

14
hours, when there was no one else around, and would go down to the clean sewer trench or later to
15

16

the theater or palm trees depending on the type of soil needed. There, we would fill up a 5-gallon

17 bucket with clean soil and bring it back to the Conex (a shipping container which served as a

18 makeshift office) where Steve Rolfe, Tina Rolfe (Steve's wife), and Rick Zahensky worked with
19 the samples. Inside the Conex the Rolfes and Zahensky would empty the true soil samples taken
20 from the areas the samples were supposed to be taken from into another 5-gallon bucket and
21

replace the sample with the clean soil from one of the three areas we got the clean soil from. Other

22
HPs and I would then dump the soil from the real samples in open sewer trenches around the site

23
24
25

before they were backfilled.
19.

The practice of swapping clean dirt for samples really picked up in frequency while

26 working in the Building 707 triangle area. Remediation in that area had been going on for about
27 two years, and after three or four rounds of remediation and post-remediation sampling it still

28
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2

wasn't clean of radioactive contamination above release levels. Frustrated by the cost and delay,
Steve Rolfe directed me to ''just go get some clean dirt." I followed Rolfe's direction and obtained

3 some sandy soil from underneath the two palm trees near building 521. I then brought the soil
4 from the palm trees to Rolfe who used the soil to submit fake soil samples for the 707 triangle area

5

6

to the laboratory for testing to secure release of the area.
20.

At the time of the Building 707 triangle area remediation and throughout the 500

7

8
9

series of buildings falsifying soil samples through the use of replacement clean soil was almost an
everyday occurrence. The switching of real samples with the fake clean soil happened pretty much

10 every day during my last year and a half or more at the shipyard. I was released from Hunters

11 Point in September of2012. I would estimate that I and my team switched real samples with fake
12 clean dirt for the samples between 800 and 1000 times. I understand from my work at Hunters

13

Point, after hours interaction with others, and my review of records, that Justin Hubbard's team

14
also engaged in similar fake soil sample submissions to the lab for years.

15
16
Chain of Custody Forms (COC)

17
18

21.

In addition to replacing suspected radioactive soil samples with soil from other

19 areas that was known to be clean to obtain fraudulent laboratory testing results, the COC
20 documents filled out for soil samples were regularly falsified. Proper procedure requires that you
21

have a COC document for each sample taken. Proper procedure also requires that the rad tech that

22
does the sampling not only fills in the COC but is also the one who maintains continuous custody

23
24

of the COC along with the samples until custody is transferred to someone else and signed off as

25 taking custody. It was expected from the COC that each HP would retain the samples and take the
26 samples to the lab, never releasing the sample and COC from possession until the COC and
27 sample was turned into the lab. The COC form is supposed to accurately reflect the time and place
28

9

1

the sample was taken and to remain in continuous possession of the sampler until samples are

2 turned over to the lab. The practice became at Hunters Point for the Rolfe team that Tina Rolfe
3 would fill out COCs in the office or conex while we worked in the field taking samples and then
4 have the rad techs sign off on the COC as if they themselves had filled in the information. Tina
5 Rolfe would simply cycle through the names ofthe HPs on my sampling crew- Rick Zahensky,

6

Jeff Rolfe and I- when filling out COC forms, regardless of who actually took the sample. On

7

some occasions Tina Rolfe listed herself as the sampler despite the fact she almost never worked

8
9

in the field, and had not taken those samples. I rarely filled out COC forms during my time at

10 Hunters Point, and almost never delivered my own samples to the lab, perhaps once a month.
11

Because the trip to the lab was considered leisure time, Steve, Tina, or Jeff Rolfe or Rick

12 Zahensky almost always delivered the samples. I also suspect that Steve Rolfe may not have

13

trusted that I would not say anything to the lab workers about the COC being wrong, or the false

14
soil samples, so that may have contributed to why I seldom made the sample delivery. When I did

15
16

make sample deliveries to the lab most of the time Steve Rolfe came with me, again maybe to

17 make sure I did not say anything.

18

22.

Looking at the COC forms from Hunters Point displays that the forms are falsified.

19 First, many soil sample COCs indicate samples were taken exactly every five minutes apart. In
20 reality, sampling often takes longer than five minutes because some surfaces are difficult to

21

penetrate, the sample must be properly bagged and labeled, and then sampling equipment must be

22
decontaminated by being double-washed and air dried. In my experience, it is impossible to take

23
24
25

soil samples every five minutes if you follow proper procedures. Second, the difference in
handwriting between the sample times and the sampler information shows that the form was filled

26 out by two different people. I can easily identify the difference in the forms containing only my
27 handwriting and those containing Tina's handwriting and my name. Lastly, I remember occasions

28
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when Tina Rolfe would fill out a COC as if I was sampling in one location, when I was actually

2 working in an entirely different area that day. For example, I recall one occasion when I took
3 samples near Building 707, but the COCs said I was sampling in the Building 500 series.

4

23.

Having someone pre-fill the COC makes it impossible to determine where and

5 when a particular sample was taken and seriously compromises the integrity of the sampling

6

results for Hunters Point. From my time at Hunters Point, I understand that the other teams, such

7

8

as Justin Hubbard's, also used fake COC documents for samples.
Sham Building Surveys

9
10
11

24.

During my time at Hunters Point, a large part of my time was spent conducting

building surveys. Building surveys generally entailed using a Ludlum 2360 with a detector to

12 identify and confirm impacted areas in need of remediation. At HPNS, proper building surveys

13

were conducted in up to three phases: Class 1, which required scanning 100% of the survey areas

14
in a space known to have rad contamination or a high likelihood of rad contamination, using a grid

15
16

system, comprising the floor and lower walls of the building; Class 2, which my supervisors

17 described as the upper wall areas of the building, and Class 3, the areas the supervisors stated were
18 the ceiling and roof areas of buildings. I understand that policies defined Class 1, 2, and 3 on
19 other criteria, but the way we used it in the field was based on the floor, walls, or ceiling and roof.
20 In my time at Hunters Point I conducted building surveys in almost all parts of the base, including
21

Parcels C, E, and G.

22
25.

Due to the amount of time required to perform a proper building survey, the

23
24

practice at Hunters Point was to scan the high probability areas and fake the rest. Although we

25 mostly performed Class 1 surveys, the Class 2 and 3 surveys were falsified by holding our
26 instrument in place, or stationary, so as to generate the required amount of data, but having
27 nothing to do with real scanning that was required. On numerous occasions my crew and I were

28
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1

instructed by HP Supervisor Steve Rolfe to ''just get numbers," which we would do by simply

2 holding the 2360 detector in the same spot, or setting it down in one spot for up to 30 minutes
3 while readings were recorded. I specifically recall "just getting numbers" at Building 707,
4
5

6

throughout the 500 series of buildings and foundation footprints, buildings 351, 351A, 411, 401,
414, 406, 144, 146, 130, 103, 113, 521, and possibly building 203, although I am not sure on
building 203. I know we followed similar flawed procedures at numerous buildings that the

7

8

Navy's studies had designated as rad-impacted.
Data Manipulation

9
10
11

26.

To the extent that building surveys were properly performed, and even when they

were not done properly, the data collected was often changed to reflect results close to background

12 radiation levels. I know this because I saw it being done. In approximately 2010, when I was in

13

the trailer uploading my instrument I noticed Tina Rolfe on the computer manually changing data

14
uploaded from previous scans. I eventually discussed the issue with other HPs and learned that
15
16

Tina Rolfe and Rick Zahinsky were told to change numbers up or down in order to have readings

17 within normal levels of radiation. I also heard Steve Rolfe chew out Zahensky and Tina Rolfe for
18 not changing the numbers sufficiently. Rick told me that at times he would take the data
19 information on a thumb drive and a work computer home and work until the early hours of the
20 morning changing thousands of numbers, all to misrepresent the data to falsely show that
21

conditions were normal at the site and avoid additional radiological remediation work.

22
27.

After learning that data was frequently changed, I raised my concerns with the

23
24

practice to my then supervisor Justin Hubbard. Hubbard told me that they were doing it

25 everywhere else on the site and that was what management wanted. I also talked to Ray Roberson,
26 Joey Cunningham, and Rick Zahensky about the issue and they all had a similar response: Tetra
27
28

12
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Tech supervisors knew about the nwnber tampering and directed that it take place; the quicker the

2 area was deemed releasable, the faster Tetra Tech could get paid for completion of the project.

3
4
5
6

Radioactive Soil Shipped Off Hunters Point

28.

When I returned to work at Hunters Point in 2006, a system was being used to scan

for radioactive contamination at Hunters Point excavated soil. The system that was used was a

7
8
9

large conveyor belt had a level of about 6 inches of soil spread on the belt. The belt would move
under a group of radioactivity sensors that were set to alarm if radioactive contamination was

10 detected above a certain set level. If soil triggered the radiation detector alarms the soil on either
11 side of the sensors for a certain number of feet was to be removed from the belt and put in low12 level radioactive containers for shipment to federally approved disposal sites. If the soil cleared

13
14

the sensors, the soil was piled up in an area designated for soil to be shipped off Hunters Point to
facilities that received soil that did not contain radioactive contamination.

15
16

29.

I was aware of the conveyor belt system and its set up, but I did not work that

17 operation. Sometime in 2006, I learned that it was discovered that Joe Lavell, a Tetra Tech
18 construction superintendent a supervisor over the conveyor belt system, had increased the speed of
19 the conveyor belt system far faster than had been approved. I also learned that Gary Wilson, a rad
20 supervisor over the conveyor belt system, and Jane Taylor (an assigned Junior Rad Tech) silenced
21

the rad detector alarms. I was informed that the conveyor belt system had been operated at 6 to 9

22
times the approved conveyor belt speed, and with no radiation detector alarms operating.

23
24
25

30.

Based on my knowledge of how the radiation detectors worked, the sensors are

much less able to detect radioactivity at higher speeds. I was informed by others at Hunters Point

26 that Joe Lavell and Gary Wilson explained that they set the conveyor belt (Joe Lavell) to run at the
27 higher speeds because the alarms kept going off at the approved speed and virtually none of the

28
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1
2

soil was able to be cleared as free of radioactive contamination within approved levels. Gary
Wilson explained that he changed the radiation detector alarm settings so the alarms did not

3 sound.

4
5

6

31.

The soil that was improperly scanned through the conveyor belt system at too fast a

speed and with no functioning alarm was improperly allowed to be shipped off Hunters Point and
was shipped off Hunters Point as non-radioactive material. After it was discovered that the

7

8
9

conveyor belt system had been run far too fast, some thousand plus cubic yards of soil still
remained in piles that had been improperly cleared by the conveyor belt system. I and other HPs

10 were assigned to help scan the soil that remained in the piles. HPs such as myself scanned soil
11

picked up by front-loaders, however the soil was two to three feet in thickness so our sensor were

12 ineffective in sensing radiological contamination much below six inches. If our sensor, which
13

14

were not fully effective due to the multiple feet of thickness to the soil, did not detect high
radioactive readings the soil was deemed "cleared" and sent in trucks to go off site. The soil then

15
16

regularly failed the Portal Monitor screening. However, HPs were restricted to scanning the truck

17 trailers of soil through the bed and side of the truck, which our instruments were not effective to
18 effectively detect the radiological contamination beyond about six inches.
19

32.

At no time was I informed that any effort was made by Tetra Tech, the Navy, or

20 others to alert the towns, counties, landfills, and others that received the large amount of soil that
21

was most likely radioactive but labeled as cleared of radioactive contamination over the months

22
before it was discovered that the conveyor belt system had been improperly run.

23
Work Culture at Hunters Point

24

25

33.

During the second half of my time at Hunters Point there was a noticeable negative

26 shift in culture which can be best described as fraudulently cutting comers wherever possible.
27 Production - that is, getting the work done as quickly as possible and with as little cost as

28
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1

possible- was the sole concern at HPNS, and it came at the expense of proper radiological

2 procedures. Fraud was committed on a daily basis. It even reached a point where field workers
3 participating in fraudulent activities established a warning system on the radios to alert one
4 another when Bert Bowers, the Radiological Safety Officer on site, was coming out in the field.

5
6

34.

The fact that these improper procedures and fraudulent practices were occurring on

a regular basis was not lost on me. However, on the occasions that I did raise concerns about the

7

8
9

way work was being performed, the response was always the same: "That is what they (Tetra Tech
management or the Navy) want - get it done and get it done fast" . We were told that "if you don't

10 like it you can go home." I regularly heard of other employees being laid off from HPNS, and
11

knew that if I refused to follow the direction of supervisors, no matter how improper or unethical I

12 believed that direction to be, I too would be let go. The generous pay and tax free per diem were
13

strong incentives to keep my head down and go along with what management wanted, and I know

14
many others felt the same.

15

16

35.

I was ultimately laid off in September 2012. By the end of my employment at

17 Hunters Point I could hardly stand the mental burden and stress due to the cheating that came with
18 the job. I experienced high blood pressure for the first time in my life. My experience at HPNS
19 and the anguish I felt for what occurred due to the frauds there has caused me to give up on the rad
20 industry and I have not worked in that business since.
21

I declare under penalty of perj ury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my

22
personal knowledge.

23

24

Executed on June 3, 2017 in Young Harris, Georgia.
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